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Alleviating social and economic inequality? The role of Social Enterprises in Thailand
Abstract
Purpose: Thailand is a developing economy underpinned by high levels of wealth inequality 
and an ingrained patronage culture. This research examines how Social Enterprises (SEs) have 
been encouraged in Thailand in recent years as ‘micro-level challenges’ to capitalism and their 
potential impact in addressing inequality. 
Design/methodology/approach: Through analysing policy documents and consultations, this 
paper traces the development of Thai policies intended to encourage SEs’ development. 
Additionally, the paper uses case study interviews and documents to demonstrate how SEs 
tackle inequality. From these, a framework is developed, outlining SEs’ roles and interventions 
to reduce inequality.
Findings: Thailand’s new policy is in contrast to those countries where SEs face policy neglect. 
Nevertheless, government has been slow to embed processes to encourage new SEs. Despite 
SEs’ ‘challenge’ to capitalism, listed companies are increasingly providing in-kind and 
financial support. The case study data shows SEs reduce inequality as they work with rural 
citizens to increase their employment and incomes. This work may also contribute to 
diminishing rural citizens’ dependency on political patronage.
Research limitation/implication: While SEs can address inequality gaps, the research 
includes only existing SEs on specific lists. Nevertheless, the Thai experience will be useful to 
other developing countries, especially those beset by political patronage. 
Originality/value: The research shows legislation is insufficient to support SE growth and 
inequality reduction. The framework highlights the need for both government policy attention 
and interventions from donors and companies to support SEs’ efforts. 
Keywords: Social Enterprise, Inequality, Patronage Governance, Thai Social Class
Paper type: Research paper
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Alleviating social and economic inequality? The role of Social Enterprises in Thailand
Introduction 
Inequality is a global issue, with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) urging policymakers worldwide to respond to published inequality 
data.i Of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) proposed by the United Nations (UN), 
Goal 10 seeks inequality reduction.ii Correspondingly, The United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) (2013) committed to supporting inequality reduction in developing 
countries, as inequality is an obstacle to global economic and social growth. Inequality relates 
to uneven resource distribution and limited opportunities, separating society into advantaged 
and disadvantaged classes and leading to many interrelated social problems such as poverty, 
health deterioration, crime and conflicts (Tweedie and Hazelton, 2019). While social 
inequalities are important, economic inequality is pervasive and affects citizens who may be 
otherwise diverse in character (Tweedie and Hazelton, 2019). 
The OECD (2008) argues that it is crucial for disadvantaged people to engage effectively in 
employment and increase labour-related earnings, but it does not differentiate between self-
employment or work for others who control capital. In contrast, some suggest standing against 
capitalism which has resulted in unjust social structures (including abuse of workers); although 
alternatives to capitalism have also been less than successful. Therefore, Tweedie and Hazelton 
(2019, p.1992) suggest options to resolve inequality at a micro-level could include “challenges 
to the primacy of the large [capitalist] corporate, profit seeking firm… from economic 
institutions founded on more equitable social relations”. This paper focuses on the rise of Social 
Enterprises (SEs) - institutions with both social and economic goals - which could be deemed 
to challenge (at a micro-level) capitalistic relationships.
The objective of this research is to understand how the Thai government has recently 
encouraged the formation of SEs, and SEs’ potential to address inequality in Thailand. From 
our data analysis we develop a framework outlining SEs’ roles and interventions to reduce 
inequality. SEs are hybrid organizations, primarily aiming to tackle social problems by 
focusing on disadvantaged citizens to enable their self-sustainability and independence, in line 
with the OECD’s (2008) recommendation. Thailand is a developing country with political 
patronage and embedded inequality and, despite recent reductions as measured by the Gini 
index,iii inequality remains high (World Bank, 2019). Concerned that inequality hinders 
economic growth, the Thai Government seeks to improve disadvantaged citizens’ quality of 
life, including more recently promoting SEs’ establishment. In 2010, the Thai Government 
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initiated a draft SE law (Thai Social Enterprise Office, 2010), approving the SE Act in 2019. 
Proposed government assistance includes grants and loans for SE start-ups to encourage SE 
expansion, and prioritization of SEs in government procurement of goods/services. If realized, 
such government support for SE establishment should create social opportunities and provide 
new investments to improve disadvantaged citizens’ earnings. Further, Thailand’s new policy 
may represent a break from the bureaucratic tensions arising in other developed countries’ SE-
enabling laws, for example, Italy, the United Kingdom (UK), and United States (US) (Anheier 
and Toepler, 2019), although this needs analysis. Many previous Thai government-sponsored 
enablers have been motivated by political patronage, although this is not evident in the new 
policies. Yet, SEs have been slow to establish due to delays in promised government support 
and regulation. Instead, donors and Stock Exchange listed companies are ‘investing’ in SEs to 
augment government policies. 
As most research on SEs is from developed countries, this research into ineqaulity reduction 
through SEs’ efforts within a novel setting (Thailand) will be useful to other developing 
countries seeking to support SE expansion. The paper first defines SEs, inequality, and how 
SEs can tackle inequality, before describing the research design. Thailand’s listed SEs are 
explored in terms of the number, the beneficiary foci, the type of business, and growth, with 
data from listed companies’ investment reports and from six SE case studies showing how SEs 
have reduced inequality through increasing disadvantaged citizens’ employment and income. 
These are used to develop a framework outlining SEs’ roles and interventions to reduce 
inequality, before the implcations and limitations are discussed.
Social Enterprises overview
SEs have emerged to tackle persistent and complex social problems in many regions, including 
Europe, the US and Asia (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008, Defourny and Kim, 2011). For 
example, the number of UK SEs has grown from 5,300 in 2003, to 70,000 in 2015, there are 
more than 85,000 social entrepreneurs in Italy, approximately 28,000 in France, but a mere 
5,200 in Poland, circa 900 in Slovakia “and only 230 in the Czech Republic that could be 
classified as social enterprises” (Pelucha et al., 2017, p.130). SEs have also been slow to form 
in Southeast Asia, despite the persistence of social and economic inequalities, although 
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis many governments (including Thailand) introduced 
SE policies (Defourny and Kim, 2011).
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As hybrid organizations, SEs incorporate three traditional organizational purposes: for-profit, 
public and not-for-profit (Billis, 2010; Doherty et al., 2014). More helpfully, Alter (2007, p.13) 
argues hybrid organizations are neither “Purely Philanthropic” nor “Purely Commercial” with 
Austin et al. (2006), suggesting SEs locate in a continuum between social and commercial 
approaches. According to Austin et al. (2006), in contrast to a commercial entrepreneur, social 
entrepreneurs respond to social opportunities in a variety of contexts and involve many 
stakeholders, but SE growth is limited by scarce human and financial resources. 
SEs are defined differently in different countries. While the US’ SE definition covers a broad 
range from for-profit with social activities to not-for-profit with business purpose; the 
European SE definition derives from the not-for-profit sector (Defourny and Nyssens, 2008) 
highlighting their social purpose, the multiple stakeholders, autonomy and the fact that they 
bear financial risks. In practice, SEs may also use different legal forms to aid their varied profit-
seeking emphasis. For example, in the US, SEs may be for-profit limited liability companies 
(Benefit Corp (B-Corp) or low-profit limited liability companies (LLLC/L3C)) owned by 
shareholders, operationally prioritize market principles, use paid employees, and gain revenues 
from sales and fees (Billis, 2010). Alternatively, not-for-profit SEs prioritizing social principles 
by using volunteers or paid employees, and (business) revenues from sales and fees, may 
register with the US Internal Revenue Service as 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations (i.e. as 
charities) (Ebrahim et al., 2014). In the UK, SEs increasingly form as Community Interest 
Companies (CIC) also with charitable, rather than business, aims (Nicholls, 2009), while Italian 
cooperatives are essentially SEs that aim to benefit their community and meet social objectives 
(Scarlato, 2012). 
As hybrid organizations, SEs can fill gaps where the government and market fail to operate; 
that is, when public-sector entities are unable to provide goods/services, or the goods/services 
are too homogeneous to suit a particular community, for-profit organizations cannot make 
sufficient profit from providing those goods/services, and not-for-profit organizations cannot 
be self-sustaining in providing these goods/services (Austin et al., 2006). SEs seek both social 
impact/benefits for beneficiaries (similar to not-for-profit organizations) and their own profits, 
in order to be financially sustainable (similar to for-profit organizations). For example, Quayes 
and Hasan (2014) research a not-for-profit microfinance SE providing financial services to low 
income earners with limited access to regular finance, which is self-funding rather than relying 
on donations as would a pure not-for-profit organization; while Van Peursem et al. (2016) 
analyse an agricultural cooperative SE developing better farming technology to increase 
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farmers’ productivity and profit, rather than exclusively shareholder returns. These SEs must 
balance the dual missions of financial sustainability and social goals (Ebrahim et al., 2014, 
Doherty et al., 2014). By providing employment and other social opportunities to reduce 
inequality in particular groups, SEs can fulfil Tweedie and Hazelton’s (2019) brief of being 
‘micro-level challenges’ to the pure capitalist economic form focused on profit/business 
objectives alone. 
Nevertheless, when SEs focus on social goals, they may jeopardize their financial 
sustainability. Naszalyi and Slama-Royer (2016) find a home care service association declared 
bankruptcy because it could not compete with free-market in-home care services to elderly and 
disabled people. Alternatively, SEs’ social objectives may be compromised by prioritizing 
profit-making over social benefits. For example, Epstein and Yuthas (2010) study a 
microfinance business which commercialized into a regulated financial institution, limiting 
poor people’s access to financial resources, and the sustainability of the SE’s social goals. 
Sustaining SEs’ social and business purposes also depends on stakeholders’ control rights. For 
example, when cooperatives must raise external capital in addition to members’ contributions 
and these external investor’s interests do not align with those of the members, the SE may drift 
from its original social mission/s (Mamouni Limnios et al., 2016). Van Peursem et al. (2016) 
find that investors seek standard reports and indicators, while farmer members prefer face-to-
face communication to assist their understanding of the cooperative’s performance. 
Even if SEs sustain both social and business purposes, and their ‘social egalitarian form’ 
(Tweedie and Hazelton, 2019), research shows that national legal and regulatory frameworks 
often create barriers, rather than empowering SE’s formation. Anheier and Toepler (2019) 
highlight ‘policy neglect’, which results in outdated regulatory frameworks, a lack of 
supporting policies and a focus on fiscal accountability, rather than accountability for social 
impact. Anheier and Toepler (2019) state that, whilst SE enabling laws are more common in 
developed countries than in the past, often the SE laws are complex, bureaucratic, burdensome, 
and fragmented. For example, in Argentina where cooperatives persist due to a strong civil 
society, no support is forthcoming from the welfare state, nor philanthropists (Anheier and 
Toepler, 2019, Kerlin, 2013). Further, Pelucha et al. (2017) note that, despite strong support 
for SEs in Central and Eastern European countries in the programming period of 2007-2013, 
SEs now face barriers due to an inflexible legislative system, a lack of clear policy approach to 
SEs, and a lack of funding from banks and other entrepreneurs. In contrast to charitable SEs 
that receive tax relief, hybrid SEs often find it difficult to access state-assisted or market-based 





























































Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change6
credit and capital (Killian and O’Regan, 2019). Among the few exceptions are Italian 
cooperative SEs that may apply for subsidized loans and the UK’s social investment tax relief, 
although this latter has had limited take-up (see Killian and O’Regan, 2019). Policy attention 
and fiscal support rather than policy neglect is necessary for SEs to thrive to reduce inequality. 
As noted, one purpose of this research is to examine how SEs, as micro-level challenges to 
capitalism, have been encouraged by recent Thai public policy. This enables us to compare 
policy neglect/support in a developing country with high levels of inequality, with the 
commonly-researched developed countries. Before we outline this novel setting, we briefly 
note the rise of inequality. 
Inequality
Inequality can arise from uneven resource distribution among different social attributes. Those 
with specific social attributes gain advantages over those who do not. For example, city 
dwellers may enjoy better education, health care and infrastructure than rural dwellers. One 
gender may be advantaged through better chances of career promotion than the other. Social 
inequality relates to social attributes where the bearer has more or less access to (or power to 
access) resources than another, potentially causing chronic social problems. For example, 
limited educational opportunities for rural dwellers reduces the likelihood they will attain self-
sustainability and independence. 
While social inequality relates to uneven access to resources and opportunities due to different 
social attributes (i.e. gender, ethnicity or social class), economic inequality focuses specifically 
on differential wealth distribution leading to uneven purchasing power (Tweedie and Hazelton, 
2019). Economic and social inequality interact when, for example, wealthier city dwellers find 
education more affordable and more easily accessed than rural dwellers. Economic inequality 
can reduce life expectancy and living standards, increase alcohol abuse, obesity, 
unemployment, homeless, social disconnections, stress, crime and the mortality rate overall 
(Neckerman and Torche, 2007). Inequality is therefore hinders a country’s development 
(World Bank, 2016), necessitating that governments design policies to narrow the inequality 
gap and assist disadvantaged citizens in engaging effectively in employment and independent 
earnings, rather than being dependent on others (OECD, 2008). 
Thailand has the highest inequality rate in Southeast Asia, which makes it apt for this research 
into inequality. Economic inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient commonly uses a cut-
off between moderate and high inequality of 0.40 (Asian Development Bank, 2013). Since 
measurement began in 1962, Thailand’s Gini coefficient has always been high (Ikemoto and 
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Limskul, 1987, Ikemoto and Uehara, 2000), peaking at 0.48 in 1992 iv (Asian Development 
Bank, 2013, World Bank, 2017), and being 0.45 in 2017.v In addition, 2009 data shows that 
the top 10% of the population earned 22.8 times more income than the poorest 10% (NESDC, 
2011). The effects of income disparity are also evident, as in 2011 the richest 20% of population 
accounted for more than 50% of total household expenditure (Asian Development Bank, 2013). 
Citizens with the lowest income are agrarians located mostly in Thailand’s rural areas 
(NESDC, 2017, World Bank, 2016). Thai rural people experience economic and social 
inequality, with low income and low social class and few economic and social opportunities. 
Reducing such inequality requires more than merely increasing citizens’ income, needing 
provision of other services such as agriculture support, education, and health services. 
In developing countries, political patronage can increase economic disparity (Bakre et al., 
2017). Patronage is strong in Thai society (Hewison, 2000) with political patrons exchanging 
financial resources for votes (Roniger, 2004), thus developing a patronage relationship with 
poor rural agrarians. Patronage paralyzes rural citizens’ independence and promotes corruption 
(Phipatseritham, 2008). For example, in Thailand, following the Asian Crisis in 1993, 
government sought to encourage self-sufficiency, and King Rama IX participated in 
reinvigorating Thai culture as part of this effort, focusing on rural communities (Kelly et al., 
2012, Nuttavuthisit et al., 2015) with greater inequality. The Prime Minister, Thaksin 
Shinawatra, introduced many policies to reduce rural inequality such as Farmers’ debt brake, 
One Tambon One Product (OTOP),vi village fund and capability development of villages and 
communities project (SML project). Yet, many of the government programs represented 
populist political patronage, exchanging government’s resources for electoral votes (Siamwalla 
and Jitsuchon, 2007, Painter, 2005). For example, the Farmers’ debt brake discouraged farmers 
from repaying their bank loans which, when promised government funds were not forthcoming, 
increased their accrued interest and reduced their sustainability; further, the SML project made 
one-off payments to villages, but poor management skills within the villages led to funding 
being wasted. These programs reduced disadvantaged citizens’ self-resilience and long-term 
financial positions (Satitniramai and Laovakul, 2005). Therefore, despite civil protests seeking 
to improve democracy (in 2005, 2010-2014), and military coups to stabilize government (in 
2006 and 2014), rural citizens remain the most disadvantaged and exhibit a vertical dependency 
within the patronage culture. Such dependency paralyzes rural communities against seeking 
new technologies and opportunities to increase their income, contradicting the OECD’s (2008) 
encouragement that disadvantaged citizens should be independent and financially sustainable. 
To reduce inequality and engage rural citizens’ economic development requires policy 





























































Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change8
attention – changes in government policy to prioritize disadvantaged citizens’ needs – 
combined with intolerance of political patronage. This research examines the Thai 
government’s policies encouraging SEs as ‘micro-level challenges to capitalism’ in contrast to 
political patronage. The link between SEs and inequality follows.
SEs and Inequality
Tweedie and Hamilton (2019) suggest organizations with a ‘social egalitarian form’ can 
challenge capitalism and by inference raise the independence of the poorest in society. SEs 
balance social and economic aims, often working with poor and those in lower social classes 
to help them to achieve independence. When such disadvantaged citizens gain independence 
through employment, education and better government policies, they also reduce their 
dependency on political patronage. Subsequent reduction in inequality leads to greater national 
wealth. 
A number of SEs have a direct influence on disadvantaged citizens’ income, with these citizens 
being the SE’s sole focus. Direct influence SEs encourage citizens to participate directly and 
increase their income. For example, a SE can help citizens to convert their farms from 
conventional to organic farming (whose produce sells at higher prices), increase agricultural 
productivity, and market their produce. Direct influence SEs also include tourism SEs or where 
social beneficiaries operate the business themselves, for example, a Thai hill tribe growing 
coffee will also market it, becoming both beneficiary and SE-business, enjoying profit and 
social impact from their labor. 
Other SEs sell products/services produced by disadvantaged citizens alongside others from 
business sources (direct-mixed SEs). These citizens directly receive income from their labour 
on products/services, but the SE is not solely devoted to their support. Direct and direct-mixed 
SEs can reduce inequality by directly increasing their beneficiaries’ income, outlet possibilities, 
and providing employment opportunities. 
The third type of SEs have an indirect influence on disadvantaged citizens’ income, increasing 
citizens’ opportunities through, for example: education, microfinance and media. Media can 
help to advertise these beneficiaries’ plight and raise donations/opportunities, giving them a 
voice that may lead to a change in government policy or in government itself. 
As noted, the second purpose of this paper is to analyse the potential for SEs to reduce 
inequality (and the UN SDG 10) through their activities. Thus, how SEs report their activities 
is important. Yet, literature debates what to measure and report, how it should be measured, 
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and for whom the report is provided (Cordery and Sinclair, 2013, Nicholls, 2009). While 
research has shown that mandatory reporting is likely to result in more and better reporting of 
impact/outcomes (McConville and Cordery, 2018, Nicholls, 2009), the requirement for Thai 
SEs to report their social impact has yet to be finalized. The method section explains how the 
research progressed. 
Research Method
The research objective is to understand how ‘micro-level challenges to capitalism’ have been 
encouraged by Thailand’s SE policies, and the potential impact of SEs in addressing inequality 
in a country beset by a patronage-based culture and relatively high inequality. 
To meet these objectives, we undertook document reviews to trace SE policy development, and 
one researcher attended public consultation meetings on the development of the SE Act 2019. 
Further, we analysed public registrations of Thai SEs and their available filings (see data in 
Tables II and III and Figure I) as well as SEs funded by companies listed on the Thai stock 
exchange (see Table IV). Thirdly, we undertook case studies of six SEs as part of a larger 
project. These case studies were chosen as they work with rural citizens and are registered on 
one or more of the formal Thai SE lists. The case research involved analysis of internal 
documents, interviews with staff (19 at management level and 21 at the operational level) and 
16 social beneficiaries, including site visits to the social beneficiaries’ areas. These interviews 
were from one to two hours in length and were recorded and subsequently transcribed. The 
interviews were conducted in the Thai language to allow participants to express their 
experience, with relevant excerpts translated for inclusion in this article. The translation was 
checked by the second author. During and after each interview, the first author took reflective 
notes. Data analysis was performed continuously, as suggested by Miles et al. (2014) to reduce 
task overload. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the within-case analysis should be performed to 
gain familiarity with the data before seeking to undertake cross-case data analysis. Hence, we 
first analysed each unique case and the positions of the SE, its staff and beneficiaries, before 
moving to cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). Data were classified so that data with similar 
meaning was grouped with codes assigned to each meaning and then examined to find patterns 
or data relationships within and across the cases. Data classification was performed repeatedly 
with new codes emerging as second order analysis was undertaken (Miles et al., 2014). 
Computer software, NVIVO, was used for data collection and to aid coding and analysis. The 
research was approved by the ethics committee of the lead author’s university and, while the 
beneficiary interviews were undertaken with the assent of the SE involved, they were 





























































Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change10
conducted independently of the SE staff. All participants were promised anonymity and 
therefore we use pseudonyms in the reporting below. 
Findings
Development of SE policy and support
First, we provide the background to Thailand’s SE Act and SE policy, its main features and 
promised supporting regulation. While cooperatives were an early form leading to SE 
development in Thailand, these chiefly provide financial management (deposits and loans to 
farmers) rather than directly working with disadvantaged citizens to increase their income and 
education.vii 
As noted, the Thai government needed to address inequality problems, with agrarian enterprise 
a focus of the National Economic and Social Development Plan (the tenth plan) (NESDP#10) 
covering 2007-2011. NESDP#10 recognized inequality between rural and urban people, 
encouraging rural citizens to build self-sufficiency through community coalitions, called 
‘community enterprises’.viii Following community enterprises’ establishment, many faced 
survival challenges as the communities lacked business and management skills, and the form 
lost its popularity (Parinyasutinun, 2017). Next, the NESDP#11 (2012-2016) introduced the 
term ‘Social Enterprise’, using media to publicize the opportunities for SE. The government 
produced a SE Master Plan for the period of 2010-2014, confirming SEs’ importance and 
outlining government’s policy vision. It required a broad SE definition (see Table I) to capture 
diverse understandings: Mali (2014) suggests that Thai SEs aim to maximize social welfare 
rather than to maximize the profit, however Tarnittanakorn (2011) defines Thai SEs as 
organizations using business principles to solve social problems. Nevertheless, 
Siriphattrasophon (2015) argues that the majority of Thai SEs started from community-based 
organizations aiming to solve social problems within the community, hence their social impact 
has been limited to a small group of people. Following the 2014 military coup, the National 
Reform Council (2015) proposed a draft SE Act, recommending SEs as alternatives to balance 
social and economic development. Most definitions in the draft SE Act concur with the Master 
Plan, except that SEs were to explicitly prioritize social objectives (see Table I). 
[INSERT TABLE I HERE]
The SE Act passed in 2019 (s. 1, 5(5.1-5.6)) requires SEs to register as legal entities to operate 
goods/services manufacturing or trading which primarily focuses on social objectives (Royal 
Thai Government, 2019), but rather than financial self-sustainability, the Act is specific about 
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the percentage of business income-generation and dividends that can be extracted. Thus, while 
the Act focuses on social objectives, SE donors/founders who are also owners may receive a 
financial return.
Further, the Revenue Department confirmed that registered SEs will be tax exempt if their total 
surplus goes to SE-reinvestment or social objectives. Corporate investments in registered SEs 
are also fully deductible, whether the SE pays a dividend or not. Due to these concessions, the 
SE Act 2019 requires SEs to operate with good governance (see Table I). 
To qualify as an SE under the Act, a SE must identify its social beneficiary group, activities, 
projected outputs and outcomes. In subsequent years, SEs must submit a social impact report 
annually to the Office of Social Enterprise Promotion to remain registered. At the SE Act public 
hearings, participants questioned how social impact could be measured and reported. Small 
SEs were concerned about the cost of assessment, whereas the well-established SEs expressed 
disquiet about the quality of different reporting measures. The official response to the public 
hearings concluded that reporting re ulations would be developed following online feedback 
from SEs as to whether social impact reports should include: (1) only mandatory information 
defined by the SE Act committee; (2) mandatory information and additional clarifying 
(voluntary) information; or (3) interview data in addition to mandatory information.ix At the 
time of writing, there have been no announcements by the SE Promotion Committee about 
whether social impact information will be mandatory or voluntary, or any exemptions.
Even prior to the SE Act 2019, financial and capacity-building support for SEs derived from 
donors, investors and government and, in 2017, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
instigated a social impact platform, listing 62 ‘social impact creators’ for corporates to invest 
in SEs (motivated by Corporate Social Responsibility). Listed companies’ investments 
typically include in-kind contributions, e.g. training courses, purchasing SE’s products and 
services, and supporting SEs’ product distribution channels,x although the SE Act 2019 
introduced tax incentives for these companies to establish and invest funds into SEs. 
Furthermore, the Thai Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permits public trading in 
certified SEs’ stock, allowing SEs to raise financial resources from the public. Additionally, 
the government encouraged its departments to procure goods/services from 29 SEs approved 
by the Social Development and Human Security Ministry in 2018 (SE Act, 2019, s. 4, 29(3)). 
The SE Act 2019 (s. 2) also encourages government to establish a SE promotion fund and make 
loans or grants to established or newly established SEs. Further, the Thai Government partially 





























































Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change12
funded the establishment of Pracharath Rak Samakkee (Thailand) SE (PRS Thailand), to 
encourage the development of new SEs that could generate social and economic returns in each 
of the 76 provinces.xi The registered capital of PRS Thailand is US$3.12 Millionxii of which 
US$0.75 Million is from the private sector, including SET listed companies.xiii External 
support from donors, investors and the SET, procurement by government departments, 
government funds for SE promotion and establishment, and through PRS Thailand for 
provincial SEs, are all intended to assist SEs to increase their social impact and address 
inequality. The SE Act 2019 and its forebears suggest policy attention rather than policy 
neglect, although some promised interventions are yet to be realized. 
Growth of SE and their focus
The SE concept was adopted long before the SE legislation, with Figure I showing that the 
number of rural SEs (52) has grown over the period from 1941 to 2016.
[INSERT FIGURE I HERE]
The number of rural SEs accelerated following the 1961 NESDP#1 which focused on industrial 
infrastructure rather than agrarian society, and consequentially increased rural citizens’ 
inequality. The second acceleration was during and post- the Asian Crisis, when unemployment 
skyrocketed in cities. Rural citizens who had relocated to Bangkok for work, returned home 
after losing their jobs, and some used business skills they had learned in the city to establish 
rural SEs. As one cause of the Asian Crisis was over-spending on industrial promotion for 
export, the Post-Crisis government promoted self-sufficiency, leading to the establishment of 
direct and direct-mixed SEs particularly in rural areas where they attempted to mitigate the 
government’s policies seeking popularity amongst rural citizens (political patronage). The final 
acceleration links to the initiation of the SE Act, with an increasing number of SEs established 
between 2011 and 2016.
Following the SE Master Plan (in 2010), the government founded the Thai Social Enterprise 
Office (TSEO) to facilitate the passing of the SE Act.xiv The TSEO recorded existing Thai SEs, 
announcing its first SE list in 2010 (the SE 50) and a further list of 70 in the ‘SE catalog’ in 
2012. We examined these lists along with the SET Social Impact List (2017), and the SE list 
by the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (2018), removing overlapping SEs 
as shown in Table II. The population of 169 SEs reflects the low numbers of SEs in Southeast 
Asia found by others (Defourny and Kim, 2011).
[INSERT TABLE II HERE]
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To ascertain how they may reduce inequality, all 169 SEs were analyzed using publically 
available information including publications on the SE 50 and SE catalog and website profiles 
for the SET Social Impact and Ministry of Social Development and Human Security lists. In 
addition, newspaper and social media were examined to confirm SE operations, their target 
beneficiary group and key activities/sector (see Table III). Table III shows that the majority of 
SEs do not target any specific beneficiary group (111/169 - 66%). However, more SEs focus 
on providing services to the rural (52/169 - 30%) than urban (6/169 - 4%) beneficiaries.xv 
Table III also details the type of SE business for different social beneficiary groups, showing 
that SEs working with rural groups mostly focus on agricuture (31%), followed by tourism 
(27%), and handicraft/garments (13%).xvi
[INSERT TABLE III HERE]
Of the 52 rural SEs, we found that 16 have a direct influence on their social beneficiaries’ 
income (6 operate in agriculture and 10 operate in tourism), directly influencing the growing 
of products/provision of tourism services and then on-selling or marketing the products and 
services. Twenty-eight rural SEs are direct-mixed, selling goods/services that agrarians 
grow/manufacture alongside other goods/services. Eight rural SEs have an indirect influence - 
operating in education, microfinance and media. 
In contrast, two of the six urban SEs have a direct influence, mainly employing local people to 
provide services such as repairs and maintenance. Urban citizens are generally more highly 
skilled than rural citizens,xvii allowing SEs to match skills and demands to increase poor urban 
citizen’s incomes and develop self-sustainability. Of the non-specific SEs, Table III shows that 
73 are involved in education, media, environment and children - these indirectly assist 
disadvantaged citizens. Further analysis also shows that the remaining 38 also have only an 
indirect impact on disadvantaged citizens’ incomes. While not denigrating the impact of these 
indirect SEs ,xviii there appear to be opportunities to develop more direct and direct-mixed SEs. 
We now turn to the reporting of the impact of direct SEs working with rural disadvantaged 
citizens.
Impacts of SEs on disadvantaged citizens
We analysed two different types of SE projects for the potential impact of SEs in addressing 
inequality in Thailand and meeting the UN’s SDG 10. The first SE projects are those from the 
SET social impact program where listed companies provide in-kind contributions and/or invest 
in SEs. They report impact in diverse ways.
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SET Social Impact program
SET began its social impact program in 2015, conferring ‘Social Enterprise Investment 
Awards’ to four listed companies, which invest or support SEs.xix Operating in urban property, 
awardee L.P.N. Development PCL invested in LPC - a direct SE which hires disadvantaged 
women for condominium cleaning services (SET, 2015). In contrast, Bangchak Corporation 
PCL (an oil and gas provider) has partnered with many local agriculture cooperatives, 
disseminating business knowledge, including market, location assessment, accounting, and 
information technology systems, supporting these cooperatives to establish community gas 
stations in impoverished rural communities (SET, 2015). The remaining two awardees invested 
in indirect SEs and are not reported here. Similarly, Thai Beverage PCL leads a consortium of 
13 listed companies investing in PRS, a direct-mixed SE with established distribution channels 
for local products in all 76 SE provinces. 
Table IV provides social impact for individual company in the SET social impact program. 
While the urban SE (LPC) reduces inequality by providing employment, for the rural Bangchak 
Corporation PCL and PRS investments, impact is reported as income to communities.
[INSERT TABLE IV HERE]
These SET social impact creators: (1) enable disadvantaged people to effectively engage in 
employment where they can increase earnings from their labour, and (2) invest in distribution 
outlets and community-focused businesses to increase disadvantaged workers’ (producers’) 
incomes and to distribute surplus funds within communities.
SE independent impact
The second group of SEs (from our case studies) report different impacts. The cases are 
anonymised as: Happy Tribe (HT), Green Trade (GT), Fisherman’s Friend (FF1), Farmers’ 
Friend (FF2), Folk Tales (FT) and Golden Land (GL). Table V provides a summary of social 
impact for each case study, which we elucidate further. First, and reflecting the questions raised 
at the public hearings on the SE Act 2019, we present data from the case studies on whether 
SEs should report impact.
Should SEs report impact?
With the regulations yet to be developed on reporting impact, the case study SEs held 
different views on this matter. HT realizes the importance of social impact with a senior 
manager reflecting: 





























































Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change15
“We measure our social impact yearly. I know that it cannot be perfect but it is 
better than nothing. Otherwise, we will over-claim our result. The accuracy of the 
assessment is that we have to justify how we measure the impact.” (HT senior 
manager) 
On the contrary, GT’s founder was reluctant to assess its social impact due to the cost and fears 
of inaccuracy, noting:
“I do not think I have the complete information to assess the social impact. The cost 
of data collection is too high and we need an accurate tool for impact calculation. 
Besides, agriculture data is dynamic. It keeps changing (i.e. the organic farming 
area or the market price of organic rice). If we cannot measure the impact 
accurately, why do we have to?” (GT founder)
Table V shows that HT and FTmeasure their impact annually, FF1 and FF2 commissioned 
external assessors to assess social return on investment (or similar), GT believes the cost of 
data collection and assessment is too high, and GL measures only its profits. Due to the 
diversity, we interviewed beneficiaries as to the impact of the SEs on their lives, particularly 
their employment/income and education.
[INSERT TABLE V HERE]
SE employment creation/income generation
Examples of employment and income generation include social beneficiaries noting that HT 
helps them to improve their quality of life, especially with respect to income generation:
“They (HT) firstly built us a road. Previously we had no road. We had to walk - cut 
through the forest. If our villagers got sick, sometimes, they died before reaching 
the hospital… HT also teaches us how to grow shade coffee and they purchase the 
beans at a higher price than we can sell to other vendors.” (HT Villager 1)
FF1’s fisher members also enjoy higher incomes:
“FF1 is our essential distribution channel for our products. Previously, we were 
forced to sell our fish to local fish raft owners who we were in debt to. They gave 
us low prices and we did not have many choices but to sell to them. Now we can sell 
through FF1 and we repaid our debt.” (FF1 Social Beneficiary 1)
“FF1 helps us to sell at Trade Fairs in Bangkok. We can gain US$2,188-2,500/day 
at the fairs. FF1 facilitates us traveling from our village to Bangkok, arranges booth 
rental and teaches us how to set a reasonable retail price. It is quite encouraging 
having extra money from the fairs.” (FF1 Social Beneficiary 2) 
“We did not think only how to sell our products but also how we can sustain our 
fishing. FF1 also helps us on this matter. They work with us on how to preserve the 
sea’s environment i.e. not using industrial fishnets, connecting our village to others 
who have the same ideas about the sea’s environment.” (FF1 Social Beneficiary 3) 
FF2’s beneficiaries also receive support on what to grow/produce:
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“I was with FF2 from the start (since 2000). Every year I ask them which type of 
organic rice I should grow and they give us suggestions and how to grow it, then 
they help us to sell the product. Now they have introduced us to organic lemons 
which I can grow in addition to rice and this increases our income. We can sell 
organic lemons for US$0.06/lemon. I have 10 lemon trees which are expected to 
have 200-250 lemons/tree. So I should have US$125-156.25.” (FF2 Social 
Beneficiary 1)
“FF2 encouraged us to raise chickens for organic eggs. They provided us with 50 
chickens for a trial and planned to provide us more - about 200-500 chickens. We 
can sell the eggs back to them to earn income.” (FF2 Social Beneficiary 2).
One group of FT’s social beneficiaries is low-waged residents of an urban-slum area in 
Bangkok and some in the community noted:
“FT firstly came to our community in 2015 to teach us how to manage community 
tourism. It took 2 years of training, including the rehearsal for a pilot tourist group. 
2017 was the first year we received 150 tourists through FT. FT also gave us an 
option to receive tourists referred from other sources.” (FT Villager 1)
“We use our people in the community as tour guides. They receive at least 
US$9.38/day/person (Thai Minimum wage/day) from guiding a community tour. We 
also receive a lump-sum amount from FT to manage the coffee break and lunch 
during the tour. We can keep the leftover in our community bank account. Now we 
have US$937.50 (during 2017-2018) in our account. We also receive indirect 
income from the tourists’ spending i.e. food, furniture from our carpenter shops,” 
(FT Villager 2)
GL has not measured its social impact, but its social beneficiaries noted:
“I sell my strawberries to GL because they provide us with a good price and we can 
generate continuous income.” (GL Social Beneficiary 1)
“We are happy, selling our products (strawberries) to GL. I was with them for 5 
years. I started with 1,500 and now I have 200,000 strawberry plants… They (GL) 
encouraged us to grow premium strawberries (fresh food grade with sweeter and 
bigger size). They purchase these premium grade at higher price of US$6.25-
7.81/Kilogram in addition to buying factory grade at a lower price 
US$0.94/Kilogram. We can sell all of our strawberries but at different prices, 
depending on product quality... it is a good price for us.” (GL Social Beneficiary 2)
“By selling our product to GL, we can ensure that we will get a lump-sum amount 
at once so we can use that to repay our debt.” (GL Social Beneficiary 3)
SE educational assistance
Many of the SE activities above include informal education designed to increase beneficiaries’ 
incomes.HT also funds education. A beneficiary noted that:
“HT entered the area when I was 7 years old. They created job opportunities for 
my family and that is how I had a chance to study in school. I received their 
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scholarship until I got a bachelor degree. They also accepted me as a trainee and I 
started working with them from 2006 until now.” (HT Villager 2)
Most impact reported by the SET investors/awardees and the SE case studies are represented 
as beneficiary income generation, but the case studies also show that direct education as well 
as knowledge and skills SEs dissemination are of great value to beneficiaries, increasing their 
wealth and therefore reducing inequality.
Discussion 
The objective of this research was to understand how SEs as micro-level challenges to 
capitalism have been encouraged in Thailand in recent years, and the potential impact of SEs 
in addressing inequality in Thailand. Inequality in Thailand persists in tandem with political 
patronage, with rural citizens being the most disadvantaged group in Thai society (NESDC, 
2018, World Bank, 2020) making rural citizens a priority for interventions to increase earnings 
for self-sustainability. The left ha d side of Figure II presents the definitions of both economic 
and social ineqaulity that were developed in this paper. Our main focus has been economic 
inequality which hinders national development (World Bank, 2016) and which the Thai 
government has felt compelled to address by encouraging SEs to form. 
SEs can improve disadvantaged citizens’ economic well-being, encouraging financial self-
sustainability through employment, income generation and also increasing opportunities by 
education scholarships or through direct education, lobbying and support (see Figure II). They 
represent “micro-level challenges to capitalism” by being founded on “more equitable social 
relations” (Tweedie and Hazelton, 2019, p.1992). 
Nevertheless, as hybrid organisations, SEs are dependent on others’ interventions to increase 
their scarce resources (Austin et al., 2006). In Thailand, donor support has allowed a small 
number of SEs to form; they have also established in response to crises and nudging from 
previously low-level government policies. Yet, only a small number concentrate on rural 
citizens, particularly in agriculture, tourism and handcraft/garments with ~12% having a direct 
influence on their social beneficiaries’ incomes, ~18% being direct-mixed, and the balance 
indirectly influencing disadvantaged citizens’ income, through education, media and working 
for the environment. The great majority are non-specific SEs and have only indirect influence 
on disadvantaged citizens. To gain maximum benefits, more direct and direct-mixed SEs 
should be encouraged to form.
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With respect to government interventions, Anheier and Toepler (2019) opine that bureaucracy 
and ‘policy neglect’ hinder SE formation, reducing SEs’ effectiveness in a number of 
developed countries, including Italy, the UK and US. SEs’ social objectives are prioritized and 
elicit taxation concessions by many governments, hampering SEs’ access to capital and credit 
(Anheier and Toepler, 2019, Killian and O’Regan, 2019, Pelucha et al., 2017). Yet, as hybrid 
organizations (Billis, 2010), SEs must balance both business and social objectives (Ebrahim et 
al., 2014, Doherty et al., 2014). Prior research has noted that when SEs emphasize social 
objectives at the expense of surpluses, they may fail (Naszalyi and Slama-Royer, 2016), and 
emphasizing business at the expense of social purposes may not serve beneficiaries (Epstein 
and Yuthas, 2010). 
The Thai government’s policy attention includes the SE Act 2019, which recognizes SEs’ 
social mission, and the need for business principles to underpin SEs’ management. It allows 
dividends in certain circumstances. Policies include the promise of government department 
procurement from SEs, recommendations that government provides funds for marketing, start-
up and SE expansion, and the ability for SEs to list on the SET. Taxation concessions accrue 
to SE investors and SEs, hence government has signalled SEs must file annual reports to certify 
their impact. The promised support and this monitoring remains under development, making 
Thailand different from cooperatives in Italy. We argue that legislation is insufficient to support 
SE growth and inequality reduction, and the planned policy interventions should urgently be 
attended to. Further, the requirement to earn 50% of income is a high bar against registration 
for newly formed donor-funded SEs, when donations may form their major revenue source. 
Such a focus on business income reduces the likelihood of ot-for-profit SEs forming to reduce 
inequality.
In addition to donor support and government’s increasing policy support for SEs, Thai 
businesses also support SEs through the SET social impact creator list, providing funds and in-
kind support, including the promotion of SE’s stock public offering (see right hand side of 
Figure II). These SET investments are tax deductible. SEs may find it challenging to manage 
investors and members (Mamouni Limnios et al., 2016, Van Peursem et al., 2016), however 
we have not assessed how the SEs receiving these SET investments have balanced the 
investors’ needs and those of their members/beneficiaries. 
[INSERT FIGURE II HERE]
Figure II shows the framework of how SEs can reduce inequality in Thailand. In addition to 
the government, donor and investor components discussed above, government must reduce 
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political patronage which increases economic disparity (Bakre et al., 2017, Hewison, 2000, 
Roniger, 2004) and disadvantaged cistizens’ dependence. A natural extension to this research 
would be the testing of this framework in other settings, especially emerging economies that 
are similar to Thailand.
While there is a requirement to report impact, the lack of regulations to frame these reports 
highlights the mixed views on, and varied nature of, social impact reporting. Despite the 
variety, it is evident that rural citizens/beneficiaries have increased employment and income 
following SEs’ interventions, which will likely help to resolve inequality. To assess the 
potential impact of SEs in addressing inequality in Thailand, we presented financial impacts 
(from SET investors) and our direct rural SE case studies show how beneficiaries report the 
impact. We note the difficulties associated with reporting impact (Cordery and Sinclair, 2013, 
McConville and Cordery, 2018, Nicholls, 2009) and the concerns raised in the public hearings 
of the Thai SE Act 2019 for SEs to submit only limited amounts of mandatory information, 
some additional voluntary information, or to provide interview data as evidence of impact. The 
lack of consensus on reporting means that policy makers should expedite regulations so that 
SEs can respond appropriately, especially if this causes SEs to de-list. The lack of detail on 
monitoring of the reporting requirement and that for good governance is also of concern. 
Undertaken in a unique context, this research is limited by existing SE lists. Further research 
into newly establishing Thai SEs, and comparisons between Thailand and other emerging 
economies would also be useful to other developing countries seeking to support SE expansion, 
especially to reduce inequality which hampers national economic growth. It is apparent that 
the interventions from govenrment policies, and the support of donors and investors can be 
harnessed to empower SEs to improve the incomes and education of disadvantaged citizens, 
and thus should be promoted more seriously by government and related bodies to address the 
inequality problem. As SEs develop skills in increasing the financial sustainability of rural 
citizens, successful SE models will be able to be replicated in other regions and abroad.





























































Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change20
References
Achavanuntabul, S. & others. (2017), Social Impact Assessment Research Development 
System for Social Enterprises and Pilot Cases 
Alter, K. (2007), Social Enterprise Typology. Virtue Ventures LLC.
Anheier, H. K. & Toepler, S. (2019), 'Policy Neglect:The True Challenge to the Nonprofit 
Sector', Nonprofit Policy Forum, Vol.10, No. 4, pp.1-9.
Asian Development Bank (2013), Poverty Analysis (Summary). Country Partnership 
Strategy: Thailand 2013-2016 [Online]. Available: 
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cps-geo-2014-2018-pa.pdf 
[Accessed 22 December 2017].
Austin, J., Stevenson, H. & Wei-Skillern, J. (2006). 'Social and Commercial 
Entrepreneurship: Same, Different, or Both?', Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
Vol. 30, pp.1-22.
Bakre, O., Lauwo, S. & McCartney, S. (2017), 'Western accounting reforms and 
accountability in wealth redistribution in patronage-based Nigerian society', 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 30, No. 6, pp. 1288-1308.
Billis, D. (2010). Hybrid organizations and the third sector: challenges for practice, theory 
and policy. Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,.
Cordery, C. & Sinclair, R. (2013), 'Measuring performance in the third sector', Qualitative 
Research in Accounting & Management, Vol. 10, No. 3/4, pp. 196-212.
Defourny, J. & Kim, S.-Y. (2011), 'Emerging models of social enterprise in Eastern Asia: a 
cross‐country analysis', Social Enterprise Journal, Vol. 7, pp. 86-111.
Defourny, J. & Nyssens, M. (2008), 'Social enterprise in Europe: recent trends and 
developments', Social Enterprise Journal, Vol. 4, pp. 202-228.
Doherty, B., Haugh, H. & Lyon, F. (2014), 'Social Enterprises as Hybrid Organizations: A 
Review and Research Agenda', International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 
16, pp. 417-436.
Ebrahim, A., Battilana, J. & Mair, J. (2014), 'The governance of social enterprises: Mission 
drift and accountability challenges in hybrid organizations', Research in 
Organizational Behavior, Vol. 34, pp. 81-100.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989), Building Theory From Case Study Research.
Epstein, M. & Yuthas, K. (2010), 'Mission impossible: Diffusion and drift in the 
microfinance industry', Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, 
Vol. 1, pp. 201-221.
Hewison, K. (2000), 'Resisting globalization: a study of localism in Thailand', The Pacific 
Review, Vol. 13, pp. 279-296.
Ikemoto, Y. & Limskul, K. (1987), 'Income Inequality and Regional Disparity in Thailand, 
1962-81', The Developing Economies, Vol. 25, pp. 249-269.
Ikemoto, Y. & Uehara, M. (2000), 'Income Inequality and Kuznets’ Hypothesis in Thailand', 
Asian Economic Journal, Vol. 14, pp. 421-443.
Kelly, M., Yutthaphonphinit, P., Seubsman, S.-a. & Sleigh, A. (2012), 'Development Policy 
in Thailand: From Top-down to Grass Roots', Asian Social Science, Vol. 8, pp. 29-39.
Kerlin, J. A. (2013), 'Defining Social Enterprise Across Different Contexts', Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 42, pp. 84-108.
Killian, S. & O’Regan, P. (2019). 'Taxation and Social Enterprise: Constraint or Incentive for 
the Common Good', Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, Vol. 10, pp. 1-18.
Mali, K. (2014), 'Social Enterprise in Thailand', Journal of Economics and Management 
Strategy, Vol 1.





























































Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change21
Mamouni Limnios, E., Watson, J., Mazzarol, T. & Soutar, G. (2016), 'Financial instruments 
and equity structures for raising capital in co-operatives', Journal of Accounting & 
Organizational Change, Vol. 12, pp. 50-74.
McConville, D. & Cordery, C. (2018), 'Charity performance reporting, regulatory approaches 
and standard-setting', Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 37, pp. 300-314.
Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M. & Saldana, J. (2014), Qualitative data analysis: A methods 
sourcebook (Third ed.). California: SAGE.
Naszalyi, P. & Slama-Royer, A. (2016), 'An “adhocracy” of stakeholders, the case of ADSA 
in France (Essonne)', Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change, Vol. 12, pp. 
8-23.
National Reform Council (2015), Social Enterprise Act proposal.
Neckerman, K. M. & Torche, F. (2007), 'Inequality: Causes and Consequences', Annual 
Review of Sociology, Vol. 33, pp. 335-357.
NESDC (2011), National Economic and Social Development Plan (The eleventh plan). 
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council.
NESDC (2017), Thailand Poverty and Inequality Analysis Report 2016 [Online]. Office of 
the National Economic and Social Development Council. Available: 
http://social.nesdb.go.th/social/Portals/0/PDF%20%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%A2%E0%B8%87%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%99%E0%B8%84%E0%B8%A7%E0
%B8%B2%E0%B8%A1%E0%B8%A2%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%88%E0%B8%99%E0%B8%AF%202559.pdf [Accessed 25 
February 2019].
NESDC (2018), Thailand poverty and income inequality report [Online]. Available: 
https://www.nesdc.go.th/ewt_w3c/ewt_dl_link.php?nid=7787 [Accessed 5 April 
2020].
Nicholls, A. (2009), 'We do good things, don’t we?’: ‘Blended Value Accounting’ in social 
entrepreneurship', Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 34, pp. 755–769.
Nuttavuthisit, K., Jindahra, P. & Prasarnphanich, P. (2015), 'Participatory community 
development: evidence from Thailand', Community Development Journal, Vol. 50, 
pp. 55-70.
OECD (2008), Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries. 
[Online]. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Available: 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/publication/9789264044197-en [Accessed 19 
July 2019].
Painter, M. (2005), 'Thaksinocracy or Manaferialization? Reforming the Thai Bureaucracy', 
Southeast Asia Research Centre. Hong Kong.
Parinyasutinun, U. (2017), 'Social Enterprise: Applying of Community Enterprise and 
Community Welfare for Managing Thung Tamsao Community', Journal of 
Community Development and Life Quality, Vol. 5, pp. 353-381.
Pelucha, M., Kourilova, J. & Kveton, V. (2017), 'Barriers of Social Entrepreneurship 
Development – A Case Study of the Czech Republic', Journal of Social 
Entrepreneurship, Vol. 8, pp. 129-148.
Phipatseritham, N. (2008), 'Determinant of Populism in Thailand (Translated title)', 
Thammasat Economic Journal, Vol. 26, No.3.
PRS (2016), Annual Report. Pracharath Rak Samakkee SE (Thailand) 
Roniger, L. (2004), 'Political Clientelism, Democracy, and Market Economy', Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 36, pp. 353-375.
Royal Thai Government (2019), Social Enterprise Act.
Satitniramai, A. & Laovakul, D. (2005), 'Thai Economic Reform after Asian Crisis 1997: 
Successes and Failures. (translated title)', Thai Economic Reform after Asian Crisis 
1997: Successes and Failures Conference. Thammasat University 
Scarlato, M. (2012), 'Social Enterprise and Development Policy: Evidence from Italy', 
Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, Vol. 3, pp. 24-49.





























































Journal of Accounting & Organizational Change22
SET (2015), Social Enterprise Investment Award. SD Focus 
Siamwalla, A. & Jitsuchon, S. (2007), Tackling Poverty: Liberalism, Populism or Welfare 
State. 2007 Conference by Chaipattana Foundation and Thailand Development 
Research Institute Foundation. .
Siriphattrasophon, S. (2015), 'A conceptual study of social enterprise development in 
Thailand', Journal of Association of Researchers Humanities and Social Sciences, 
Vol. 20, pp. 30-47.
Tarnittanakorn, N. (2011), 'Social enterprise: business for social value creation', Executive 
Journal, Vol. 31, pp. 30-35.
Thai Social Enterprise Office (2010), The Master Plan : Social Enterprise (Draft).
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2013. Humanity Divided: Confronting 
Inequality in Developing Countries 
Tweedie, D. & Hazelton, J. (2019), 'Economic inequality: problems and perspectives for 
interdisciplinary accounting research', Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, Vol. 32, pp. 1414-1435.
Van Peursem, K., Old, K. & Locke, S. (2016), 'Socializing accounting practices in governing 
boards: Dairy co-operatives down-under', Journal of Accounting & Organizational 
Change, Vol. 12, pp. 75-102.
Working Group of Grassroots Economic and Social Enterprise Development (2019), Manual 
No.5 : Working Group of Grassroots Economic and Social Enterprise Development 
2018-2019.
World Bank (2016), Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality. [Online]. 
World Bank. Available: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25078 
[Accessed 22 February 2019].
World Bank (2017), World Development Indicators [Online]. World Bank. Available: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/si.pov.gini [Accessed 01 December 2017].
World Bank (2019), Report: Thailand Economic Monitor, January 2019: Inequality, 
Opportunity and Human Capital [Online]. World Bank. Available: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/154541547736805518/pdf/Thailand-
Economic-Monitor-Inequality-Opportunity-and-Human-Capital.pdf [Accessed 22 
February 2019].
World Bank (2020), Taking the pulse of poverty and inequality in Thailand [Online]. 
Available: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/thailand/publication/taking-the-




iii The Gini coefficient is widely used to measure inequality of income distribution across a country. The 
coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, where perfect equality is 0 and perfect inequality is 1.
iv The world’s highest GINI coefficient in 1992 was Central African Republic at 0.61 and Southeast Asia’s highest 
was Thailand at 0.48 (World Bank 2017b). 
vAs noted by the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) (which changed its name from the 
National Economic and Social Development Council (NESDC) in 29 December 2018): 
http://social.nesdb.go.th/SocialStat/StatReport_Final.aspx?reportid=694&template=1R1C&yeartype=M&subcat
id=71
vi OTOP is a government project to support the selling of locally unique and high quality products from each 
Thai sub-district (tambon) (see https://www.thaitambon.com/en/)
vii The turnover of financial cooperatives in 2017 and 2018 represent 93% of the total turnover of all registered 
cooperatives; cooperatives involved in distributing merchandise to members and product gathering represent 3% 
each of the total turnover of all Thai cooperatives (See Thailand cooperative performance and financial position 
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report 2017 and 2018, prepared by Cooperative Auditing Department, at 
https://statistic.cad.go.th/main.php?filename=report_infoall)
viii Community Enterprise is an entity operated by a local community for manufacturing, trading or services to 
generate incomes (Source: Community Enterprise Act 2005)
ix The lead author’s observations from the 23 March 2019 Bangkok consultation on the SE Act 2019.
x Source: https://www.setsocialimpact.com/Article/Detail/51211
xi According to an announcement of Office of SE Promotion, dated 15 November 2019.
xii The amount is converted from 100 Million Thai Baht at 1 USD = 32 THB (as at March 2020).
xiii Information from PRS annual report 2016 (p.15). The amount is converted from 24 Million Baht.
xiv The current NESDP#12 (the twelfth plan), covering 2017-2021, attempts to redress inequality by promoting 
jobs and creating income for 40% of population with the lowest income. It includes an indicator requiring an 
increase in the number of SEs to strengthen rural communities.
xv The number of poor rural citizens is three times higher than poor urban citizens in 2010 (see: Table 1.4, p.1-9 
in Thailand’s poverty and inequality analysis report 2017 by the NESDC).
xvi From the mid-1980s to 1991, the agriculture sector employed 60-70% of Thailand’s total workers (LePoer, 
1997; World Bank 2017a). 
xvii The Department of Skill Development, Ministry of Labor, offers more than 20 vocational training courses, 
targeting poor urban citizens to improve their skills.
xviii For example, media SEs can reduce inequality by raising public awareness of inequality and could 
encourage disadvantaged citizens to increase their involvement in democracy/governance or economic policies 
addressing inequality. These could reduce the economic disruption (measured by declining GDP) from political 
protests, which disadvantaged citizens have previously used to gain attention (see: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD).
xix The four companies are Bangchak Corporation PCL, L.P.N. Development PCL, the Siam Cement Group PCL 
and SE-Education PCL (source: SET SD Focus magazine, Year 2, issue 3, October 2015 and issue 4, November 
2015).
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Figure I: Number of rural SEs by founding year
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Figure II: Using SEs to reduce inequality  
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Table I: SE Definition and requirements
SE Master Plan
(2010-2014)
Draft SE Act 2015 SE Act 2019
Any form of organization Legal entity under Thai Law Legal entity under Thai Law 
Focus on solving social, 
community and environment 
problems, not to maximize profit 
to shareholders or owner
Focus on solving social, community and 
environment problems, with a primary goal 
on social objective rather than maximizing 
profit to shareholders or owner
Focus primarily on social objectives, including
- Hiring a group of people with special-needs
- Solving social/community/ environment problems
- Creating/producing social/community benefit 
Ensure self-financial 
sustainability 
Same as the Master plan Not less than 50% of SEs’ revenues must be derived from their 
business operations. 
Allocate SE surplus to reinvest in 
SE for social goal achievement or 
public interest
Same as the Master plan SEs may pay dividends to owners if at least 70% of the net profit is 
allocated to social objectives/reinvested into the SE (i.e. not more 
than 30% of net profit may be distributed as dividends). 
Operate friendly production 
processes with social and 
environmental benefits
Same as the Master plan None
Obtain good governance Same as the Master plan Obtain good governance.1
- - SEs must report to the Office of Social Enterprise Promotion which 
should annually monitor and certify that the SE meets the Act’s 
requirements and may continue to be registered. 
1 The SE Promotion Committee announced on 24 September 2020 that SEs’ good governance also requires they have an anti-fraud and bribery policy, comply with related 
good governance rules and regulations (if any) including arranging appropriate meetings (i.e. board and shareholders’ meetings) and ensure proper auditing and taxation, have 
internal control and risk management systems and publically disclose operational and financial reports on an annual basis.
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Table II: Number of SEs on various lists
List Number of SEs
SE 50 (2010 50
SE Catalog (2012) 70
SET Social Impact List (2017) 62
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (2018) 29
Total SEs from all lists 211
Overlapping SEs (42)
Total SEs 169
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Table III: SEs’ activities/type of business sector
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Table IV: Social impact of SET social impact program
Company Social Impact
LPC Co., Ltd - Hired over 1,200 disadvantaged women, increasing their earnings
Bangchak 
Corporation PCL
- Increased income of 620 partner cooperatives by US$12,500-
31,250/year/cooperative. 1
- Produced turnover of community gas stations with ‘minimarts’ of 
0.31-0.37 Million US$/year for communities. 2
Thai Beverage PCL - Invested in Pracharath Rak Samakkee SE (Thailand) (PRS) which 
the Working Group of Grassroots Economic and Social Enterprise 
Development (2019) reported that PRS-provinces made incomes 
from 2016-2018 totalling US$17 Million.3
1 These 620 cooperatives are not currently registered as SEs, although they do appear to comply with the 
definition under the SE Act (2019). The income increase is converted from 400,000-1,000,000 Thai Baht at 1 
USD = 32 THB (as at March 2020).
2 The amount of income turnover is 10-12 Million Baht at 1 USD = 32 THB (as at March 2020).
3 Calculated from 543,125,385 THB to USD at 1 USD = 32 THB
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Table V: A Summary of Cases’ Social Impact
Case Study Social Goals Social Impact
Happy Tribe (HT)
(Self-social impact assessment 
by HT)
A direct SE for >30 years, with a social objective 
to improve hill tribes’ communities’ quality of life. 
Began as a donor-funded Foundation, now self-
sufficient.
Income
- Increased income of hill tribe citizen from US$116 in 1988 
to US$2,945/person/year in 2017 
Educational opportunities
- Improved bachelor degree educational opportunities for hill 
tribe citizens from 0.2% in 1993 to 7.9% in 2016. 
Green Trade (GT)
(Published social impact 
assessment by Achavanuntabul 
and others (2017))
A direct SE for >15 years, encouraging rural 
organic farming and value-added agriculture 
products.
Income
- Increased organic farmers’ income to US$31/Hectare 
(100%)
- Decreased farmers’ operational costs by US$5.13/Hectare 
(31%).
Fisherman’s Friend (FF1)
(Published social impact 
assessment by Achavanuntabul 
and others (2017))
A direct SE for 5 years, whose trading business 
purchases organic fishery products from local 
fishing villages in rural areas.
Income
- Increased income by US$35-50/member/month 
Farmers’ Friend (FF2)
(Self-social impact assessment 
by external evaluator)
A direct SE for >12 years, assisting rural agrarians 
to convert from conventional to organic farming 
and to sell their organic products.
Income
- Social Return on Investment that every US$0.03 invested, 
returns US$0.08.
Folk Tales (FT)
(Self-social impact assessment 
by external evaluator)
A direct SE for >5 years, working with 
marginalized communities seeking to showcase 
traditional ways of Thai life to tourists, especially 
through corporate tourism.
Income
- Increased community’s income by US$14,063/year from 
the tourism activities during 2013-2016
- Generated US$1,687,500 from 2011-2018 for local 
communities.
Golden Land (GL) A direct SE for 25 years, whose agriculture food 
processes business purchases agricultural products 
from their social beneficiaries, mostly from hill 
tribe villagers who they encouraged to abandon 
opium cultivation. Began as a donor-funded 
Foundation, now self-sufficient.
No social impact assessment
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